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Detection and Prevention of Black Hole attack In Modified AOMDV Routing Protocol in MANET

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Abstract

Security is the major issues of wireless ad hoc network because of its dynamic and infrastructure characteristics. Wireless network is a collection mobile nodes and each node behaves like host or router which are capable to determine the route for the packet but that nodes can get compromised from the security threats such as blackhole, wormhole, Sybil and denial of service attack etc. Black hole attack is one of active attack which advertises itself as having the fresh or shortest route to destination and then drop them. To locate a safe route and to significantly lessen the intercepting probability, it is proposed an approach which uses blacklisting criteria with IDS for all the replies from the neighbouring nodes. In this paper, proposes an approach to mitigate the black hole attack and the simulation and analysis of the proposed method is done in NS-2.34 network simulator using AODV and AOMDV routing protocol.

Keywords: Attacks, AODV, AMODV, MANET, Security Threats.

1. Introduction

NETWORK security is a weak link in wired and wireless network systems. Malevolent attacks include reason marvelous loss by impairing the functionalities of the computer networks. Therefore, security is a major concern for protected communication between mobile nodes in a hostile environment. In hostile environments adversaries can bunch active and passive attacks against intercept able routing in embed in routing message and data packets [1]. Wireless Mobile Ad-Hoc networks (MANETs) are networks that do not employ external devices like routers or access points in the network. In these networks, the mobile node present shows properties of both the terminal and the router. The system is thus considered infrastructure-less and the mobile nature of nodes requires it to be self-configuring. The communication between the source node and the destination node requires the generation of path between them with the inclusion of the intermediate nodes. The path generation involves searching a path that is optimal and hence there is a need for algorithms that perform the task efficiently. The route generation in MANETs is usually performed using two protocols: reactive routing protocols and proactive routing protocols. In proactive routing protocols, the nodes maintain tables containing the exact topology of the network. These tables provide an exact optimized route from the source to the destination. However, these tables need to be updated frequently as the topology changes. In the case of MANETs, the topology changes quite frequently as the nodes are mobile. This makes proactive routing protocols computationally heavy in the scenario. Some proactive routing protocols used extensively are destination sequence distance vector (DSDV) [2] and optimized link state routing (OLSR) [3]. In reactive routing protocols, the source node initializes the route search only during the time of requirement. Reactive routing protocols are bandwidth efficient on demand routing protocols ideal for MANETs because of the dynamic topology of the mobile nodes. Some examples of routing protocols are Ad-Hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV)[4] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [5]. The source node in reactive routing protocols broadcasts route request packets through the whole network in order to establish a route to the destination. There have been several algorithms in the literature that are specialized for generating optimized paths in MANET. The most popular algorithms are reactive routing protocols. Reactive routing algorithms have less computational overheads as nodes are not required to maintain a path from them to all other nodes, but are to generate the best route when required. The AODV

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protocol is among the most popular protocols for route searching in MANETs. In this paper, route searching using a modified AODV protocol is thus evaluated and compared. The algorithms designed for their communication are thus required to satisfy properties like authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, availability of resources, etc. There are attackers who look into ways of performing malicious activities in these networks. A blackhole attack [6] is a quite common choice for attackers in MANETs, in which a malicious node forges a route from the source to the destination through itself and then carries out eavesdropping or drops the packets sent through them. There is a need to identify and eliminate these nodes in order to prevent blackhole attacks in AODV routing protocol. In route discovery process of AODV protocol, intermediate nodes are responsible to find a fresh path to the destination, sending discovery packets to the neighbour nodes. Malicious nodes do not use this process and instead, they immediately respond to the source node with false information as though it has fresh enough path to the destination. Therefore source node sends its data packets via the malicious node to the destination assuming it is a true path. In any case, nodes in the network will constantly try to find a route for the destination, which makes the node consume its battery in addition to losing packets. The attack that we implement is the well known attack called BlackHole attack. We have simulated our proposed scheme using performance metrics such as PDR, Normalized Routing Load (NRL), End to End delay etc and it is analyzed that our scheme is more effective in detecting and thwarting the black hole attacks from the network.



Fig.1 Mobile ad hoc networks

2. Black Hole Attack in AODV

In Black hole attack a malicious node broadcasts about the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to seize [7].In following figure, imagine, M is malicious node. When node A broadcasts a RREQ packet, nodes B, D and M receive it. Node M, being a malicious node, this node does not check up with its routing table for the requested route to node E. Hence, it immediately sends back a RREP packet, claiming that it has a route to the destination. Node "A" receives the RREP from M ahead of the RREP from B and D. Node A assumes that the route through M is the shortest route and sends any packet to the destination through it. When the node A sends data to M, it absorbs all the data and thus behaves like a „Black hole".



Fig 1. Black hole attack in AODV

Fig. 2 Black-hole attack in AODV routing protocol

In AODV there are two type of black hole attack, these are following.

Internal Black hole attack This type of black hole attack has an internal malicious node which fits in between the routes of given source and destination, when it gets the chance this malicious node makes itself an active data route element. Now this node is capable of conducting attack with the start of data transmission. This is an internal attack because node itself belongs to the data route.

External black hole attack External attack physically stays outside of the network and denies access to network. External attack can become a kind of internal attack when it take a control of internal malicious node and control it to attack other nodes in MANET. External black hole attack can be summarized as following points:

1. Malicious node detects the active route and notes the destination address.

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2. Malicious node sends a route reply packet (RREP) including the destination address field spoofed to an unknown destination address. Hop count value is set to lowest values and the sequence number is set to the highest value.

3. Malicious node send RREP to the nearest available node which belongs to the active route. This can also be send directly to the data source node if route is available.

4. The RREP received by the nearest available node to the malicious node will relayed via the established inverse route to the data of source node.

5. The new information received in the route reply will allow the source node to update its routing table.

6. New route selected by source node for selecting data.

7. The malicious node will drop now all the data to which it belong in the route.

3. Related Work

Singh, et al. [8] proposed work focuses on trust based computing to mitigate the effects of black hole, wormhole and collaborative black hole attacks. Trust value is computed on the basis of route request, route reply and data packets. After calculation get trust values between 0 to 1. If trust value is greater than 0.5 then marks node is reliable and allow on a network otherwise block. Network performance of proposed protocol trusted secure AODV routing protocol (TSAODV) is evaluated. The result shows performance improvement as compared to standard AODV protocol.

Shashwat et al. [9] presented a modification of theexisting AODV routing protocol to prevent blackhole attacks in MANETs in an erratic terrain with ahigh probability of packet loss. A mathematical proof is given to confirm the effectiveness of theproposed algorithm with respect to the previous solution in the literature.

Vimal Kumar and Rakesh Kumar [10] Presented a more proficient explanation for identifying a black holeattack with less communication rate in the MANET, which ispredominantly susceptible compared to infrastructure-basednetworks because of its mobility and shared broadcast nature. As an adversaries can effectively deploy blackhole attack in the network. Itcan be seen that projected work is much protected than the existingsolutions. They also compared its performance to standard AODVrouting protocol. The experimental consequences showed that theprojected approach is better than standard AODV.

Gojiya et al. [11]Intended a resolution to the black hole attack in one of the utmost prominent routing algorithm, ad-hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) routing, for the MANETs. The anticipated scheme employs the Watchdog mechanism to detect malevolent node with usage of local information of intermediary node and propagates the information of black hole node to all other node in network the simulation consequences showed the proficiency of anticipated scheme in presences of black hole node.

Apurva Jain et al.[12]This paper customized AODV, which is TAODV (Trust based AODV), is a network. TAODV has numerous noteworthy features as Nodes perform trusted routing behavior mainly according to the trust relationship s among them. A node that executes black hole behaviour will be detected and challenges by the whole network TAODV mollify the effect of Black Hole attack but average end-to-end delay increases in TAODV. In Indoor background Pareto traffic condition, gives the best result as far as average throughput is consider. On the other hand, Exponential traffic condition gives the preeminent outcome for average end-to-end delay and CBR traffic condition traffic condition the best outcome for packet delivery ratio. In Outdoor environment, Pareto traffic condition gives the preeminent consequence for average throughput and packet delivery ratio and Exponential traffic circumstance gives the best outcome for average end-to-end delay.

Rakhi Sharma and Dr D.V Gupta [13], This work, blackhole attack and its diverse exposure techniques are presented with literature assessment of unusual research papers that covers black hole exposure and anticipation mechanism. A blackhole node behaves maliciously in network and suggested wrong data routing information or may descent the messages receives from other nodes. Therefore it is complicated to uncover black hole attack and avoid network from them. These techniques are used in the evasion of network from blackhole attack.

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Harsh and Rashmi et al. [14] proposed a method in which broadcast synchronization (BS) and relative distance (RD) method of clock synchronization is used to prevent the black hole nodes. In this internal and external clock node compare with the threshold clock if both the clock time is greater than the threshold then it is found that the node is malicious. This method can easily detect and prevent the block-hole node.

TaranpreetKauretet al.[15] they proposed a clustering behaviour based reputation mechanism to recognize the flooding malicious nodes in military battlefield network. Since in battlefield situation; mainly Group Mobility model is followed so grouping of nodes in clusters have a variety of advantages. Reputation (appraisal of its behavior in the network) of a node is calculated at cluster heads. This approach has double nature, therefore it efficiently fix the false detection of genuine nodes as malicious ones. The performance of new method is compared with AODV protocol based on different performance measures it is noticed that proposed strategy has better performance in terms of various measures.

4. Proposed Methodology

Mobile Ad-hoc network is very challenging field because number of various region one measure challenge is topology control, and rather than that other region is data drop through mis-activity, an-authorized access and MAC error, so here we design a proposal to remove the blackhole activity using blacklist criteria as well as mis-activity node identification base method and that work enhance the performance of the mobile ad-hoc network. In our proposal initially we set IDS node that watch the all neighbor node and if IDS get any unwanted activity in nearby range so continues watch to the particular node and if attacker node receives the packet but not forward it so simply that node set as attacker and we block the node, another thing is if any node continues send the routing packet in particular node that is also set as attacker and block it, after the blocking we change the route and send data safely to the destination. In our mechanism we also check each node packet delivery ratio in various time factor bases and provide the strength to IDS scheme.

4.1 Proposed IDS algorithm for finding Blacklist Criteria for Blackhole Attacker Nodes

```
Set mobile node = M          //Total Mobile Nodes
Set Sender node = S          //S Ɛ M
Set Receiver Node = R     // R Ɛ M
Set Routing Protocol =AODV
Start simulation time = t0
Set radio range = rr;     //initialize radio range

AODV-RREQ_B(S, R, rr)
          {
If ((rr<=250) && (next hop >0))
          {
          Compute route ()
          {
rtable->insert(rtable->rt_nexthop); // next hop to RREQ source
 rtable1->insert(rtable1->rt_nexthop); // next hop to RREQ destination
if (dest==true)

{sendack to source node with rtable1;
Data_packet_send(s_no, nexthop, type)
          }
else              {
                    Destination not found;
                  }
          }
          }
          else { destination un-reachable ;
    }
          }
RREQ_Limit_Check (S, R, M)
      {
Bi € M        // Malicious node
PDRu,v      // packet delivery ratio of path u to v
        Bi generate Msg
          Bi Broadcast (Msg, ii)
          If (Ireceives Msg)
          {
 Calculate Tn= Msg-ti- Msg-t1// where I end message in time t
Cnt(Msg)            // total message count
∂ = Msg/Tn                    // per packet time
If (limit-time <= (∂*10))
{
Node is blacklisted node
RREQ_Blacklist()
              }
else ((node € M) && (RREQ < 10 pkts/s && (incoming =-true && outgoing ==true))
            {
 RREQ accepted by neighbor;
RREQ_Accept_limit();
              Calculate PDR
            }

RREQ_Blacklist()
{ can't accept by neighbor ;
                  Block RREQ sender ;
                  Packet Delivery Ratio set 0;
 }
          // check Path PDR
          PDRu,v = PDRu∩ PDRi∩-------- PDRj∩ PDRv
                If (PDRu,v> 90)
                          { path is reliable }
```

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Else { search new path for communication}
}

4.2 Proposed Algorithm

Step1: Set Various Number of Mobile Nodes N0,N1,……..Nm,
Step2: Set various Sender Nodes in the network S0, S1,……Sm,
Step3: Set Receiver Nodes in the network R0, R1,……Rm,
Step4: Now we set Routing Protocol AODV and AOMDV, set Area 800x600 and also set Radio Range 550.
Step5: Sending Route Request RREQ Form source to destination.
Step6: Set Radio Range RR<=550 or RR>=250 , Next hop>0, Now we check the condition
If Route Request RREQ satisfied this condition, Then we compute route /hop for RREQ, Otherwise RREQ goes into out of range.
Step7: Now routing table is updated and update all information about RREQ which is send through the source and check next hop to RREQ source/destination.
Step8: Set Destination = True, if Route Request RREQ find exact destination location where data packets is send Then receiver send acknowledgement for per data packet If condition is not satisfied then destination is not found
Step9: Set clock Route Request RREQ limit (S,R,M), which is stand for S = Sender nodes, R = Receiver nodes, M = Mobile nodes.
Step10: W1,W2 nodes is automatically initialize these W1,W2 nodes are malicious nodes .
Step11: Now verify and calculate PDR.
Step12: Malicious nodes Wi broadcast their message in the group.
Step13: If All mobile nodes which is present in the network received message of malicious node Wi
Then we check the condition, Tn= (msg-ti)-(msg-t1),With the help of this condition we check which nodes is malicious , which nodes not satisfied the condition that current time is less than previous time that type of nodes is malicious.
Step14: Now we count message per time (msg/tn).
Step15: Set Limit time, limit_time<=Speed Limit<=10,If condition is satisfied then again identified node is blacklisted or not , Otherwise Route Request RREQ<=10pkts/s and outgoing and incoming is active.
Step16: If node is blacklisted or malicious then check path for PDR and when we find Route Request is blacklisted Then Block this Route Request RREQ Which is send through the sender and set PDR=0.
Step17: When we found which node is malicious, Now we set value for PDR and check the condition route is secure or not for Original RREQ , Set value for PDR

PDR>90

If condition is satisfied then we find secure path for moving Route Request RREQ or data pkts, otherwise search for new path.

5. Experimental Result and Analysis

5.1 Simulation Setup

NS2 is used for simulation. The simulation network consists of 30 nodes deployed in a field of 1000X1000 square meters. Some nodes are set in promiscuous mode. A random mobility model is used for node movements. The Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic and FTP is used as the traffic model. Each simulation is run for 500,1000,1500,2000 seconds. Some malicious nodes are introduced which drop packets send of forwarding to next hop. The results are read with varying number of malicious nodes. Some observations are taken for a particular scenario (no. of normal and malicious nodes combination) and the data are averaged.

Table 1 Criteria for network design

Simulation Area	1000X1000,500X500
No of nodes	30
No of blackhole nodes	0,1,2
Communication traffic	CBR,FTP
Maximum no of connections	30
Simulation duration	500,1000,1500,2000 seconds
Pause time	50 to 400 seconds
Maximum speed of nodes	40
Radio propagation model	Two ray ground
Packet size	2 packet/sec
Data size	512 bytes

5.2 SCENARIO SETUP

Figure shows the simulation setup of our proposed algorithm. In this Scenario setup there are 30 mobile nodes placed defined with trajectory with 1 km × 1 km area. The simulation time was taken 500 to 2000 seconds and pause time taken is every 2seconds. For the research work a scenario is designed with 30 nodes for analysis of proposed algorithm. For doing analysis Four parameters; Packet Delivery Ratio, End-to-End delay, Throughput and routing load is taken consideration in this dissertation. These Scenarios will help the researcher to observe and analyze the performances of proposed algorithm.

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

Fig. 3 Zero blackhole nodes in NS2

In this Scenario there are 30 nodes in the network which is placed in the area 1000x1000 and no of blackhole nodes zero, one, and two are also placed in network which is shown in fig 3,fig 4, and fig 5.In the presence of no of blackhole nodes in network security is very less so here for overcome this problem used new concept of intrusion detection system for AODV and AOMDV routing protocols in this dissertation and improve the security of mobile ad-hoc network. Here we simulated varying number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M and 2M in NS2 environment and observe the performance of network in the presence of these blackhole nodes.



Fig. 4 One Blackhole nodes in NS2



Fig. 5 Two blackhole nodes in NS2

5.3 COLLECTION OF RESULTS AND STATISTICS OF SIMULATED PARAMETER.

After simulating the network with the specified parameters shown in table 5.1 following results are collected for all ten characteristic parameters.

5.3.1 PACKET DELIVERY RATIO (PDR)

PDR is a parameter which is used for analyzing the performance of an algorithm in network. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) is the ratio between the number of packets transmitted by a traffic source and the number of packets received by a traffic destination. A high packet delivery ratio is desired in a network. Greater the value of PDR gives better performance.

$$\mathbf{PDR} = \frac{\sum \textbf{Number of Packet Received}}{\sum \textbf{Number of Packet Send}}$$

Table 2 Packet delivery Ratio in AODV for Proposed Algorithm

PAUSE TIME	0-AODV	1W-AODV	2W-AODV	IDS-AODV
50	98.02	53.58	17.55	84.72
100	85.95	51.59	18.03	83.24
150	78.70	51.59	18.95	83.06
200	75.60	51.08	19.39	82.88
250	73.19	49.84	20.28	85.17

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300	74.36	48.41	21.21	83.62
350	75.17	47.34	21.86	82.28
400	75.15	46.28	22.36	86.00

Table 2Shows scenario of Packet delivery ratio of proposed algorithm for number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M,2M and IDS node in AODV at different pause time.

Table 3 Packet delivery ratio in AOMDV for Proposed Algorithm

PAUSE TIME	0-AOMDV	1W-AOMDV	2W-AOMDV	IDS-AOMDV
50	98.18	66.13	66.26	90.26
100	96.93	74.38	66.40	90.40
150	95.69	75.26	64.03	88.03
200	99.97	73.18	61.13	85.13
250	96.27	70.77	57.23	81.23
300	93.94	69.16	54.72	78.72
350	92.31	68.34	53.19	77.19
400	91.27	67.70	52.02	76.02

Table 3Shows scenario of Packet delivery ratio of proposed algorithm for number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M, 2M and IDS node in AOMDV at different pause time

Table 4 PDR Performance Improvement AOMDV over AODV for proposed algorithm

Pause Time	PDR in IDS-AODV	PDR in IDS AOMDV	%improvement of PDR in IDS-AOMDV
50	84.72	90.26	5.54
100	83.24	90.40	7.16
150	83.06	88.03	4.97
200	82.88	85.13	2.42
250	85.17	81.23	3.94
300	83.62	78.72	4.90
350	82.28	77.19	5.09
400	86.00	76.02	9.98

The Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) parameters generated in the simulated MANET scenario with varying number of blackhole nodes 0,1,2 and IDS node using standard AODV and AOMDV routing protocol is shown in table 2 and 3 . It can be observed that the data packets have traversed for varying number of blackhole nodes at different pause time during simulation. Analyzing the PDR parameters/data collected for AODV and AOMDV protocols for proposed algorithm shows percentage of improved performance of AOMDV as compared with AODV protocol. In both AODV and AOMDV protocols values of IDS-PDR is higher as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M and 2M.



Figure 6 Packet delivery ratio for proposed algorithm in AODV

The graphical representation of figure 6 of PDR parameters shows the number of packets transmitted by a traffic source and the number of packets received by a traffic destination by IDS-AOMDV is at the higher side as compared to varying number of blackhole nodes 0,1and 2 at different pause time and the graphical representation in figure 7 show that the performance of

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PDR parameters at different pause time for IDS-AODV is higher as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes and less as compare to AOMDV. The higher packet delivery ratio or greater the value of PDR gives better the performance of AOMDV as compare to AODV.



Fig.7 Packet delivery ratio for proposed algorithm in AOMDV

5.5.2-NORMALIZED ROUTING LOAD

NRL is the number of routing packets transmitted per data packet delivered at the pursuit. Each hop-wise transmission of a routing packet is counted as one transmission, this should be minimized.

NRL = No of routing packet send

No of receiving packet

Table 5Shows scenario of Normalized routing load of proposed algorithm for number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M, 2M and IDS node in AODV at different pause time

Table 5 normalized routing load for proposed algorithm in AODV

Pause Time	0W-AODV	1W-AODV	2W-AODV	IDS-AODV
50	9.1	7.4	12.9	3.9
100	16.7	11.5	22.8	6.5
150	18.6	13.0	28.8	7.9
200	20.3	14.0	33.6	8.4
250	21.7	20.4	38.4	10.2
300	22.3	28.8	42.3	15.2
350	22.9	37.3	46.3	21.3
400	25.7	47.0	50.4	24.6

Table 6 Normalized routing load for proposed algorithm in AOMDV

Pause Time	0W-AOMDV	1W-AOMDV	2W-AOMDV	IDS-AOMDV
50	8.1	8.2	9.6	8.7
100	15.8	15.8	18.1	16.3
150	22.8	23.2	25.0	22.5
200	28.9	30.6	32.7	29.5
250	35.3	38.7	40.3	36.4
300	41.9	45.5	47.4	42.7
350	48.8	52.7	55.2	49.8
400	55.6	59.0	61.9	55.8

Table 6 Shows Normalized routing load for proposed algorithm for number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M,2M and IDS node in AOMDV at different pause time

Table 7 NRL Performance Improvement AOMDV over AODV for proposed algorithm

Pause Time	NRL in IDS-AODV	NRL in IDS-AOMDV	% improvement of NRL in IDS-AODV
50	3.9	8.7	4.8

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100	6.5	16.3	9.8
150	7.9	22.5	14.6
200	8.4	29.5	21.1
250	10.2	36.4	26.2
300	15.2	42.7	27.5
350	21.3	49.8	28.5
400	24.6	55.8	31.2

The Normalized routing load(NRL) parameters generated in the simulated MANET scenario with varying number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M,2M and IDS node using standard AODV and AOMDV routing protocol is shown in table 5 and 6 . It can be observed that the routing load have traversed for varying number of blackhole nodes at different pause time during simulation. Analyzing the Normalized Routing load (NRL) for AODV and AOMDV protocols for proposed algorithm shows percentage of improved performance of AODV as compared with AOMDV protocol. In both AODV and AOMDV protocols values of IDS-NRL is less as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M and 2M.



Fig. 8 Normalized routing load for proposed algorithm in AODV



Fig. 9 Normalized routing load for proposed algorithm in AOMDV

The graphical representation of fig. 8 of Normalized routing load(NRL) shows the number of routing packets transmitted per data packet delivered at the pursuit by IDS-NRL is at the less side as compared to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M and 2M in AODV protocol at different pause time and also the graphical representation in fig. 9 show that the performance of Normalized routing load(NRL) at different pause time for IDS-NRL is less as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes in AOMDV protocol. The minimized Normalized routing load or minimum value of NRL gives better performance of AODV as compare to AOMDV.

5.5.3- END-TO-END DELAY: The average time taken by the packets to pass through the network is called end-to-end delay. The time when a sender generates the packet and it is received by the application layer of pursuit, it is represented in seconds. This should be minimized.

Table 8 End-to-End delay for proposed algorithm in AODV

Pause Time	0W-AODV	1W-AODV	2W-AODV	IDS-AODV
50	2.36	95.67	236.32	2.36
100	2.76	124.36	275.64	2.76
150	2.34	95.67	233.98	2.34
200	2.9	164.72	289.56	2.9
250	2.45	95.67	245.44	2.45

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300	1.01	164.72	259.73	1.01
350	8.46	117.3	236.14	11.31
400	8.52	164.72	260.36	8.52

Table 8 Shows End-to-End delay for proposed algorithm of number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M, 2M and IDS node in AODV at different pause time

Table 9 End-to-End delay for proposed algorithm in AOMDV

Pause Time	0W-AOMDV	1W-AOMDV	2W-AOMDV	IDS-AOMDV
50	338.08	350.34	358.53	343.54
100	370.83	383.09	391.28	376.29
150	375.03	387.28	395.48	380.48
200	340.69	352.94	361.14	346.14
250	504.33	516.59	524.78	509.74
300	361.19	373.44	381.64	366.64
350	596.77	609.03	617.22	602.23
400	336.04	348.29	356.49	341.49

Table 9 Shows End-to-End delay of proposed algorithm for number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M, 2M and IDS node in AOMDV at different pause time

Table10 Delay Performance Improvement AOMDV over AODV for proposed algorithm

Pause Time	Delay in IDS-AODV	Delay in IDS-AOMDV	%improvement of Delay in IDS-AODV
50	2.36	343.54	341.18
100	2.76	376.29	373.3
150	2.34	380.48	378.14
200	2.9	346.14	343.24
250	2.45	509.74	507.29
300	1.01	366.64	365.63
350	11.31	602.23	590.92
400	8.52	341.49	332.97

The End-to-End delay parameters generated in the simulated MANET scenario with varying number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M,2M and IDS node using standard AODV and AOMDV routing protocol is shown in table 8 and table 9. It can be observed that the delay have traversed for varying number of blackhole nodes at different pause time during simulation. Analyzing the End-to-End delay for AODV and AOMDV protocols for proposed algorithm shows percentage of improved performance of AODV as compared with AOMDV protocol. In both AODV and AOMDV protocols values of IDS-delay is less as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M and 2M.



Fig. 10 End-to-End delays for proposed algorithm in AODV

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

Fig. 11 End-to-End delays for proposed algorithm in AOMDV

The graphical representation of fig. 10 of End-to-End delay shows the average time taken by the packets to pass through the network by IDS-edelay is at the less side as compared to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M and 2M in AODV protocol at different pause time and also the graphical representation in fig. 11 show that the performance of End-to-End delay at different pause time for IDS-edelay is less as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes in AOMDV protocol. The minimized End-to-End delay or minimum value of Edelay gives better performance of AODV as compare to AOMDV

5.5.4 THROUGHPUT: Network throughput is measured as the total number of packets received at the destination over a period of time and is expressed in kbps. This should be maximized.

Table 11 Throughput for proposed algorithm in AODV

Pause Time	0W-AODV	1W-AODV	2W-AODV	IDS-AODV
50	77.40	47.48	4.64	94.45
100	84.99	39.82	4.56	94.45
150	93.14	37.15	4.56	96.08
200	94.66	32.36	4.55	83.91
250	93.67	30.66	4.63	75.27
300	91.46	31.56	4.51	70.31
350	93.55	31.95	4.50	66.17
400	96.14	30.46	4.49	61.93

Table 11 Shows Throughput of proposed algorithm for number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M,2M and IDS node in AODV at different pause time.

The Throughput parameters generated in the simulated MANET scenario with varying number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M,2M and IDS node using standard AODV and AOMDV routing protocol is shown in table 11 and 12. It can be observed that the Throughput have traversed for varying number of blackhole nodes at different pause time during simulation. Analyzing the Throughput for AODV and AOMDV protocols for proposed algorithm shows percentage of improved performance of AODV as compared with AOMDV protocol. In both AODV and AOMDV protocols values of IDS-Throughput is higher as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M, 1M and 2M.

Table 12 Throughput for proposed algorithm in AOMDV

Pause Time	0W-AOMDV	1W-AOMDV	2W-AOMDV	IDS-AOMDV
50	80.58	47.38	42.03	63.05
100	97.37	67.54	52.05	78.06
150	98.45	67.15	50.83	76.24
200	97.50	65.65	48.78	73.18
250	97.43	63.97	46.75	70.13
300	97.40	64.76	46.64	69.96
350	98.73	66.92	47.26	70.90
400	98.77	68.32	47.10	70.65

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Table 12 Shows Throughput of proposed algorithm for number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M,2M and IDS node in AOMDV at different pause time

Table 13 Throughput Performance Improvement AODV over AOMDV for proposed algorithm

Pause Time	Throughput in IDS-AODV	Throughput in IDS-AOMDV	%improvement of Throughput in IDS-AODV
50	94.45	63.05	31.4
100	94.45	78.06	16.36
150	96.08	76.24	19.84
200	83.91	73.18	7.67
250	75.27	70.13	5.14
300	70.31	69.96	0.35
350	66.17	70.90	4.73
400	61.93	70.65	8.72



Fig. 12 Throughput for Proposed algorithm in AODV

The graphical representation of fig. 12 of Throughput shows the throughput is measured as the total number of packets received at the destination over a period of time by IDS-Throughput is at the higher side as compared to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M and 2M in AODV protocol at different pause time and also the graphical representation in fig. 13 show that the performance of Throughput at different pause time for IDS-Throughput is higher as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes in AOMDV protocol. The maximized Throughput or maximum value of Throughput gives better performance of AODV as compare to AOMDV



Fig. 13 Throughput for proposed algorithm in AOMDV

6. Conclusion

This chapter has details of implementation of developed methodology. In addition, networks are developed with 30 nodes using discrete event based simulator Network Simulator 2.34 and for analyzing the performances of Proposed algorithm in both protocols AODV and AOMDV is done on the bases of Table 5.1 fixed parameters, on four parameters Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), Normalized routing load(NRL), End-to-End delay and Throughput .Simulation results are shown above in Tables 5.2(a)(b), 5.3(a)(b), 5.4(a)(b), 5.5(a)(b) for parameters Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), Normalized routing load(NRL), End-to-End delay and Throughput and further analysis is by plotting graph on generated data. It can be summarized that PDR is better in AOMDV as compare to AODV and other parameters Normalized routing load (NRL), End-to-End delay and Throughput is better in AODV as compare to AOMDV. As from above discussion we find that values of IDS-PDR, IDS-NRL, IDS-EDELAY, and IDS-Throughput is better as compare to varying number of blackhole nodes 0M,1M and 2M in both protocols AODV and AOMDV.

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